Press Statement following the Tripartite Meeting between the Leaders of Russia, Germany and France door President PUTIN, 23 september 2006.

Many thanks dear Mr President, dear ladies and gentlemen.

We have just had very comprehensive and productive talks with the Chancellor of Germany and the President of France.

The meeting took place in the spirit of openness and full mutual understanding that we have come to expect. Once again this meeting showed that this tripartite format is both in demand and produces positive results in practice. We see this format as a good and reliable mechanism to coordinate approaches and develop joint initiatives in the spirit of our strategic partnership.

Once again I shall emphasize that exchanging opinions in such a regular fashion allows us to not only better understand one another but also to react adequately to topical international threats and challenges, as well as coordinate our positions bilaterally.

Here I would like to point out at once the similarity of our positions on basic international problems. Jacques just mentioned this. And we once again confirmed our common aspiration to find a just settlement for the situation in the Middle East, including in Lebanon. Our common mood with regards to the political and diplomatic resolution of the situation surrounding the Iranian nuclear dossier was also evident. And we have similar opinions with regards to creating conditions for establishing long-term stability in other explosive areas as well.

During the meeting we talked about the results of the G8 summit in St Petersburg. I am confident that when transferring the presidency from Russia to Germany we will be able to cooperate productively, including in spheres that hold special priority for us such as energy, the development of education, and the struggle against infectious diseases.

We paid special attention to Russia’s relations with the EU. It is obvious that developing the four common spaces remains an unconditional priority in cooperation between Russia and the EU. We hope that the true interest in deepening cooperation between Russia and the EU that our French and German partners showed at this meeting will allow us to seriously turn towards resolving the tasks at hand. I consider that such an approach will be conserved during Germany’s forthcoming EU presidency and then by France.

With regards to the other sectors in which we engage in tripartite cooperation I would also note that cooperation in industry and in energy are priorities for us. Russia is interested in mutual cooperation relations and in implementing joint projects in the high-tech spheres: in aviation, aerospace and modern transport infrastructure.

Of course we talked about the space sector and about aviation in reference to concrete projects. As you know, just yesterday we signed bilateral documents which will give us the opportunity to implement transport and infrastructure projects together and, in this case, projects of more than ten billion USD with our French partners. We have big plans with Germany in the energy sector and in mechanical engineering.

All of this was at the centre of our attention and I must point out that our meeting was not only constructive but was extremely business oriented and concrete. I am very thankful to the President of France, Jacques Chirac, for creating such a business-like and favourable atmosphere.

Thanks very much.

VLADIMIR PUTIN

Nach dem Untergang des Abendlandes door Felix Philipp INGOLD in FAZ, 23 augustus 2006.

Die russischen Neoeurasier haben eine geopolitische Vision

Unter der kaum aussprechbaren, aber dennoch populär gewordenen Bezeichnung „Neoeurasianismus" (neojewrazianstwo) hat sich in Rußland seit den mittleren neunziger Jahren ein neues politisches Denken durchgesetzt, das heute in vielen Parteiprogrammen und selbst in Regierungserklärungen zumindest als Spurenelement nachzuweisen ist. Sprecher und Organisator der neoeurasischen Bewegung ist der rastlos agierende Philosoph Alexander Dugin, von dem mehrere staatstheoretische und allgemein politikwissenschaftliche Werke vorliegen, der seine öffentliche Präsenz jedoch durch Fernsehauftritte, streitbare Interviews, publizistische Tageskommentare oder Grundsatzreden in der Duma markiert: Charakteristisch für den Neoeurasianismus insgesamt und für Dugin ist die Tatsache, daß die neue Lehre parteiübergreifend das ganze politische Spektrum von der extremen Rechten bis zur extremen Linken zu erfassen vermag, ausgenommen die liberale Mitte, deren Einstehen für Demokratie, Marktwirtschaft und Menschenrechte in neoeurasischer Optik als geradezu kriminelle Verirrung sich darstellt.

Die absolute Heimat

Zum Neoeurasianismus bekennen sich heute nicht nur einflußreiche Politiker, sondern auch viele angesehene Kulturschaffende, darunter der Kinoregisseur Nikita Michalkow und der kasachische Dichter Olshas Sulejmenow. Neoslawophile, Neofaschisten und Neostalinisten scheinen im politischen Horizont des Neoeurasianismus eine gemeinsame ideologische Heimat gefunden zu haben, dazu allerdings auch gemeinsame ideologische Feinde, zu denen neben den „Liberalen" auch so unterschiedliche Interessenträger wie die „Oligarchen", die „Freimaurer", die „Menschenrechtler", die „Westler", die „Kapitalisten" und, allen voran, die „Juden" gehören.

Als Hauptwerk des neoeurasischen Denkens gilt Dugins tausendseitige Monographie über die „Grundlagen der Geopolitik", die seit 1996 in immer wieder neu konzipierten Editionen erscheint, ein autoritatives „Lehrbuch für alle Entscheidungsträger in den wichtigsten Sphären des rußländischen politischen Lebens", zugleich eine Rückschau auf frühere geopolitische Theoriebildungen und der Versuch, diese nun erstmals in eine „geopolitische Doktrin Rußlands" einzubringen. Diese Doktrin weist Rußland auf der Weltkarte die Schlüssellage zu, so daß auf deren Mittelachse Sibirien und der indische Subkontinent auf gleicher Breite zu liegen kommen und nicht, wie üblich, das westliche Europa zwischen Nordschweden und Süditalien.

Dugins Lehre, die durch weitere Buchtitel wie „Die absolute Heimat", „Wege des Absoluten", „Mysterien Eurasiens" oder „Die russische Sache" repräsentiert ist, läuft nicht bloß auf die Kollision unvereinbarer Kulturen hinaus, sondern auf einen „unabwendbaren Großen Krieg der Kontinente, ein unaufhörliches Duell der Zivilisationen und deren tektonischen Zusammenprall" - West und Ost, Meer und Land, Atlantismus und Eurasiertum. Hier stehen sich Leviathan und Behemot in apokalyptischem Widerstreit gegenüber, und Rußland wird es letztlich beschieden sein, aus diesem Widerstreit als neue Weltmacht hervorzugehen: „Die Basis ist gelegt, die Grundprinzipien sind geklärt. Doch das ist erst der Anfang eines Weges, der uns nach der Logik der Dinge aus dem Abgrund zum Licht neuer russischer Himmelssphären und zum heiligen Fleisch der russischen Erde emporführen wird."

Die bisweilen esoterisch anmutende Rhetorik, deren sich Dugin in seinen Programmschriften befleißigt, sollte nicht über den erbarmungslosen Rigorismus seines Denkens hinwegtäuschen. Es läßt alles hinter sich, was der Bolschewismus an Weltbeglückung imaginiert und als Weltrevolution gefordert hat. Die Geopolitik der Neoeurasier ist zugleich ein militanter Patriotismus, der die Heimat absolut setzt und ihr globale Dimensionen verleiht. Als seine Vorbilder und Gewährsleute zitiert Dugin — mit großem Respekt — vorwiegend westeuropäische Autoren, allen voran Karl Haushofer und Carl Schmitt, aber auch die exilrussischen „Eurasier" der zwanziger Jahre und deren letzten Nachfahren, den sowjetischen „Ethnogenetiker" Lew Gumiljow, der heute als Vordenker der neuen russischen Rechten hohen postumen Ruhm genießt.

Schon das frühe Eurasiertum war ausgeprägt staatsgläubig und machtorientiert, imperialistisch, nationalistisch und dezidiert antiwestlich eingestellt, mit merklichen bolschewistischen beziehungsweise stalinistischen Sympathien, dominiert von herausragenden Intellektuellen wie dem Linguisten Nikolaj Trubezkoj, dem Geographen Pjotr Sawizkij, dem Historiker Georgij Wernadskij und dem Musikologen Ejotr Suwtschinskij, die im wesentlichen die theoretischen Grundlagen der eurasischen Ideologie ausgearbeitet haben, an die der Neoeurasianismus nun anknüpft, wobei er sie um eine reichlich diffuse religiöse Dimension ergänzt.

Erst unlängst hat Igor Wischnewezkij in einer aufsehenerregenden Studie nachweisen und dokumentieren können, welch außerordentlichen, vor allem propagandistischen Anteil die Musikkultur der russischen Moderne an der Verbreitung der eurasischen Idee seit 1920 bis in die Jahre des stalinistischen Staatsterrors gehabt hat. Sergej Prokofjew, zurückgekehrt in die Sowjetunion und zum Volkskünstler avanciert, schrieb aus Anlaß des zwanzigsten Jahrestages der Oktoberrevolution eine große eurasianisch inspirierte Kantate und wenig später auch ein konzertantes Trinklied auf den Diktator.

Im Sinn und Geist des Eurasiertums haben sich auch die Komponisten Artur Lurje, Igor Strawinskij und Igor Markewitsch engagiert, sei es mit programmusikalischen Werken, die östlichen Primitivismus gegen westlichen Formalismus ins Spiel brachten, sei es (wie Lurje oder Suwtschinskij) mit eigenständigen theoretischen Schriften und politischen Deklarationen. Auf singuläre Weise gingen hier das Komponieren, die Abfassung musikästhetischer Programmschriften sowie philosophische Reflexionen „im Geist der Musik" eine produktive Verbindung ein, freilich allzuoft in unkritischer Annäherung an die stalinistische Sowjetunion.

Eine neue Kulturepoche

Strawinski, der von solcher Sympathie unberührt blieb, gab schon 1914 gegenüber Romain Rolland seine Verachtung für die Dekadenz der westlichen Musikkultur zu erkennen und sah für Rußland „die Rolle eines herrlichen barbarischen Landes", das erfüllt sei von „Keimlingen neuer Ideen" und „potent genug, den Weltgedanken zu befruchten". Reife oder gar Vollkommenheit, wie Sträwinski sie in der europäischen Musik erreicht sah, hielt er für den „Anfang des Untergangs", für die „niedrigste Stufe der Lebensfähigkeit". Damit knüpfte er allerdings bloß an Leo Tolstois Generalabrechnung mit der tradierten „hohen Kunst" an - zugunsten einer neuzuschaffenden „Volkskunst".

Die Pioniere des Eurasiertums gingen von einem „organischen" Kultur- und Kunstverständnis aus, das an Begriffen wie „Kraft" und „Reife", „Blüte" oder „Zerfall" orientiert ist und das an Oswald Spenglers kulturtypologische Klassifizierungen in dessen „Untergang des Abendlandes" (1918 bis 1922) erinnert. Dieser „Untergang" wird nun von den Neoeurasiern wortreich herbeigeredet in der Überzeugung, daß danach eine qualitativ neue Kulturepoche folgt, welche weder europäisch noch asiatisch, sondern eben eurasisch sein wird — angeführt vom rußländischen Vielvölkerstaat, einer „vollkommen eigenständigen ethnischen Gemeinschaft“, die allein in der Lage sei, den West-Ost-Konflikt geopolitisch zu bereinigen.


Bron: Felix Philipp Ingold in der Frankfurter Allgemeinen Zeitung, vom 23.08.2006

In Defense of the National Idea door Sergei MARKEDONOV in Russia in Global Affairs, September 2006.

The very survival of the Russian state could very well hinge on the question of its national self-identification. And the lack of answers to this “damned conundrum” makes the country’s political stability, not to mention the progress and well-being of its people, almost impossible. Russians talk incessantly about more efficient economic models, doubling of the Gross Domestic Product, curbing poverty and reforming the education system and the Armed Forces, but all these endeavors will eventually prove futile. The majority of social, economic, political and managerial decisions taken per se – void of ideological content – are essentially getting us nowhere.

A government official who is not aware of his country’s national interests is nothing more than a glutton for the taxpayers’ money. Similarly, a well-equipped and well-trained soldier who is unaware of the reasons he bears the heavy burden of military service is nothing more than cannon fodder or a common brigand. Even the excitement that the sportsman feels will amount to nothing if the sense of the homeland disappears. (Perhaps this is the reason that the World Cup football championships involving national teams draw much greater enthusiasm than the heavily financed European Club Championships?)

Affiliation with one’s homeland and state does not simply unite millions of people together in a human community. It unites them in a shared perception of their common history, common sentiments, and a common faith in the prospects for the future, or, likewise, a shared disbelief in the possibility of a common future. After all, the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia disintegrated because of mass disenchantment with the Communist idea and its promise of a bright future, and not because of the Belovezha Forest “scheming” [a decision by Russian, Ukrainian and Belarusian leaders made in the Belovezha Forest preserve in Belarus in 1991– Ed.], plotting by the Americans, or “Jewish-ridden mason lodges.”

The life of an individual who has the sense of belonging to a community has a meaning that is hard to understand at the rational level. How could one possibly explain by rationalistic logic the fact that thousands of Russians – who enjoy access to all the benefits of Western civilization and are potentially capable of engaging in successful commercial or research activity abroad – choose to live in Russia and are ready to go through the outrages of “managed democracy.” The people show a readiness to stay with their nation “right where it, unfortunately, is,” or “right where it will, fortunately, be.” The government receives millions of opinions from members of this community called ‘Russia.’ These sentiments are out there floating in the air in the form of mass notions, perceptions and emotions. The government must simply collect these opinions, summarize their messages, and express the people’s collective will at the level of rationale – with the aid of laws, legislation and practical policy instruments. This means that, apart from furnishing people with answers to questions such as, ‘Who are we,’ ‘Where do we come from,’ and ‘Where are we going,’ a national policy must explain the historic and practical import of the country’s existence. Without an intelligently conceived and comprehensible national policy, it is impossible to understand what force has brought together the Russians, Tatars, Yakuts, Kalmyks, Jews, Armenians, and others, on a territory that takes up one-eighth of the land surface of the Earth. It will remain unclear why they should continue this unity, what price they should pay for it and what sacrifices they should make if need be. Answers to these questions are the real identification marks of any nation-state.

But do the one hundred and forty-five million people living in the Russian Federation know for certain which of those marks really express their will? Furthermore, what meaning does the state assign to its existence? How does it justify it? I dare say there is no clear system of identification marks even in the minds of those who must have it by virtue of their occupational duty. In fact, they mull over several such systems. The problem is that no one system provides for the image of Russia as a young and democratic state that rose from the bourgeois democratic revolution of August 1991. At the same time, however, there exist some mythical images of Russia.

Myth number one pertains to the image of the Soviet Union, which the people cherishing that period associate with a golden age “when people lived like gods knowing no grief but serenity.” How do they look at today’s Russia? They view it as a pitiful vestige of the great Soviet Union, a deficient state that is not worth defending.

But was it not the Soviet Union that split into fifteen separate entities along the ethnic principle? Was it not Soviet policy that suppressed the freedom of all citizens without exception and brewed the resounding ethnic conflicts in Nagorno-Karabakh, Abkhazia and Transniedstria, while verbally proclaiming the hitherto unheard-of rights of all constituent peoples? Moreover, was it not the Soviet leadership’s stubborn refusal to democratize the country that eventually let the various nationalistic forces pulling the country apart join a powerful anti-Communist movement?

Myth number two is the Russian Empire whose “historical continuity we must restore,” as the propagators of this concept proclaim. But such logic would also necessitate the restoration of classes, the monarchy, and the Jewish Pale of Settlement [a prohibition that demanded the Jews live beyond a certain internal border – Ed.]. Thinking along these lines, we may go as far as a return to serfdom. But was it not the Russian Empire’s archaic autocratic regime and the policy of ethnic limitations that paved the way to the Red Turmoil of 1917 and the empire’s eventual ruin?

Myth number three talks about Russia’s “rebirth” or “return to its roots.” This idea is extolled by leaders of ethnic nationalist movements in Russia’s constituent republics and by all kinds of regional movements (the Cossacks, for example). The masterminds behind the “rebirth” project underline the exclusively ancient origins of their ethnic groups and bluntly claim property rights to “indigenous lands.” They seem to be undisturbed by the fact that restoration of the past will necessarily bring back the problems of the past. While they are making claims, we are becoming witnesses to the re-emergence of abreks [old-time brigands] in Chechnya and in the entire North Caucasus, to nepotism raised to the level of government policy, to restrictions on businessmen “of alien blood,” and to demands to deport “aliens” or non-indigenes from the “indigenous lands.”

Remarkably, the creators of these three myths angrily condemn one another, yet their seemingly different slogans are basically similar: today’s Russia does not exist as a reality for them and is of no interest to them. They detest the new historical community that is taking shape in the public consciousness of our compatriots. This historical community represents the nascent civil-political Russian nation. Had this realization not entered the mind of the average citizen, this country would have followed the path of the former Soviet Union or Yugoslavia. Numerous opinion polls indicate that even the Chechens, Russia’s most problematic ethnic group, mostly link their future to the Russian Federation, which means they welcome Russian citizenship. Add to this the number of immigrants to Russia, people who failed to settle in their historic homelands (Germany, Greece and Israel, for example), and chose to live in Russia. There is an increasing tendency for people to choose Russia over their “land of kinship by blood.” Now, can you imagine the Abkhazians associating themselves with Georgia, or the Armenians living in Nagorno-Karabakh with Azerbaijan?

Of course, the subconscious assimilation of an individual as a Russian does not suffice for forming the Russian nation. Thus, the government must work hard toward the eventual rise of a civil-political community that will incorporate, as Alexander Pushkin put it, “all tongues in her [Russia’s] use.”

Yet the elaboration of an ideology as a set of values to be shared by all Russian citizens has so far failed to win the attention of the Russian government. The formation of a new Russian national identity has been pushed to the sidelines of the political agenda by issues of power and property control. The fact that Russia is a multi-ethnic and multi-religious country is realized by all segments of the social and political forces. However, mere affirmation of this fact is insufficient for a successful national policy. A united social, economic, political and legal space will become a reality – not a proclamation – only if all the inhabitants of Russia develop an understanding that they belong to their nation by virtue of shared civil and political identity, and not through the bonds of blood.

Such an approach does not deny ethnic identity as such, nor does it call for dropping ethnic identity in favor of political loyalty to the state. Like any individual who has private interests, together with interests shared with the community, members of each ethnic group in Russia may continue their affiliations with their narrow group/corporate interests and also supra-ethnic common values. This approach will affirm the fact that Moscow is the national capital and the Russian tricolor, the national standard. This approach implies the practical materialization of Ernest Gellner’s formula, which argues that a nation is a fusion of good will, culture and statehood.

In the meantime, Russia’s national policy designed at the turn of the millennium took no account of the importance of supra-ethnic principles in its nation-building. On the contrary, Russian national policy planners stressed the importance of rendering support – political, financial, social or humanitarian – to the so-called ethnic/cultural autonomies. In reality, this meant supporting the elites of various ethnic groups – from Russians to indigenous peoples of the North. In fact, national policy was replaced with a folklore/ethnographic policy. Its set of instruments was mainly comprised of heavily budgeted feasts and festivals of folk cultures, as well as innumerable “dialogs” and roundtable conferences involving spokespeople from ethnic communities and diasporas.
Furthermore, in Russia’s constituent republics this policy was conceived as granting the representatives of titular (indigenous) ethnos preferential positions in government agencies and business. As a result, in those regions the principle of “blood kinship” took root in the social, economic, political and human-resource practices, and suppressed the rise of civil society institutions. Affiliation with a titular ethnic group acquired greater importance for these people than did their association with Russia in general, the Russian state or society.

It is quite obvious that this dilemma cannot be solved by a return to monarchy or the Communist ideology. Consequently, a new supra-ethnic national idea should rely on different principles – democracy, loyalty to civil society, and patriotism toward the Russian state. However, if those people who are currently trying to discredit democracy are ultimately successful, their efforts will not rebuild the Millennium-Old Russia or Holy Rus. Indeed, their efforts will bring the Russian state to ruin.

Russia’s effective Constitution clearly defines the country’s political and legal foundations as democratic in nature. Thus, any renunciation of democracy, to say nothing of officially fixing that renunciation, would be tantamount to destroying the foundation of the edifice of a renovated state. It is equally obvious that the development of supra-ethnic national policy principles will not be a one-step action. Such a policy cannot be decreed since it will require new conceptual and technical approaches – from unification of education principles (in humanities, in the first place), to changes in the information policies of government-controlled mass media. Indeed, how long shall we continue printing textbooks in which the Sumerians and Etruscans are described as the ancient ancestors of the Tatars, Bashkirians, Ingushes and other ethnic groups?

The Concept of State National Policy, the only document specially devoted to Russia’s ethnic problems has, for a variety of reasons, failed to become a guideline for action. Right after its adoption in 1996, the document stirred argument among political analysts; the debates still continue today. However, it is important that the Concept, good or bad as it was, appeared during Boris Yeltsin’s epoch. This was a time when Russia was just starting its new nation building, and its territorial integrity hinged on buying – openly or covertly – the loyalty of regional elites.

Today, the concept of Russia’s national policy requires revision, but this must not boil down to simply rewriting certain paragraphs so that they agree with transitory changes in the Kremlin. First, we need a document with an entirely new set of notions. Second, it must not be some sort of a bureaucratic epistle, but a clear message to Russian nationals of different ethnic origins and religious affiliations. Third, it should contain an ideological project that is oriented toward the integration of peoples, as opposed to maintaining a “civilized” form of apartheid.

Russia’s national policy has been operating with a language that is based on archaic Stalinist conventions. Russian politicians continue to equate ‘nation’ and ‘ethnos,’ while they interpret the concept of ‘nation’ as a “historically-formed community of people that arose from a specific language, territory, economic practices and psychological mold and manifest in a common culture.” This means that state policies are targeted at ethnically formed nations, i.e. collective entities, not individuals. Hence the state assigns little value to civil and human rights, giving priority to the rights of ethnic groups as opposed to individuals. This approach produces the notion that an ethnic group has rightful claims to a territory denoted as “national republic.” On the face of it, a new concept of national policy should regard ‘nation’ as a civil and political society, an association of Russian citizens irrespective of their ethnic or social origin as a source of sovereignty.

The issue requires more, however, than a mere change in terminology, or the simple redefinition of the word ‘nation.’ It amounts to giving a new content to national policy. Karl Deutsch’s concept of nation as a society that has acquired the state machinery and put it to its service could become an ideological and political formula of a revamped national policy. If Russia fails to overcome the “cult of blood kinship” and form a civil society that would replace the vertical bureaucratic structure, it will be doomed to an existence that is fraught with the specter of civil war and a permanent search for friends and foes.

The formation of Russia’s new national policy is taking place amidst the broadening global crisis concerning the concept of the nation-state, which is instigated by the confrontation between globalization and ethnic separatism. Russia has a unique opportunity to reconsider and reformulate particular values of the nation-state that have long turned into axioms in Europe and the U.S., where they have lost novelty – and sometimes even adequacy. As a young state in search of identity, Russia has a chance to offer a new efficient model for national relations – both for its own good and the good of the world.

Sergei Markedonov is a department director at the Institute of Political and Military Analysis.

Bron: Russia in Global Affairs

Could Russia Become a Federation of Peoples Rather than Territories ? door Paul GOBLE in Russia Profile, September 2006.

In order to prevent the disintegration of the Russian Federation, Moscow should drop the current linkage between ethnicity and territory and create a political system based on a federation of peoples rather than one consisting of republics, oblasts and krays, according to the leader of the Eurasian Movement.


In an article published in this week’s issue of „Rossiya,” Aleksandr Dugin argues that the existence of national republics as „self-standing” subjects of the federation inevitably become sources of tension. But disbanding them in favor of a unitary state, as some near the Kremlin now advocate, could entail even greater dangers.

Indeed, the Eurasianist ideologue continues, „movement toward a unitary state will just as surely blow Russia apart as will the further development of territorial federalism” there.

„A unitary state in the case of Russia is the worst of all possible variants,” Dugin insists, „because it would be achieved via the genocide of unique ethnoses which are included within it,” pointedly noting that such „a genocide” would threaten not only small peoples „who would assimilate into the large people” but also „the large people” as well.

That is because, the outspoken commentators continues, that community ­ obviously the ethnic Russians ­ would „lose its unique ethnic qualities, its special way of life, and its traditions, and its representatives would become simply citizens of a nation state” (Dugin’s article is available at http://evrazia.org/modules.php?name=News&file=article&sid=2890.)

To avoid the dangers inherent in both these arrangements, Dugin argues that Russian Federation should be transformed „from its current territorial federalism into ethno-federalism; that is, one in which ethnic groups rather than ethnic territories are the constituent elements of the state.

Such an arrangement, Dugin says, would allow for the creation of a political system in which there would be a great deal of autonomy and juridical pluralism without the threat of disintegration because its components would not be territories whose residents would view these areas as potential states but peoples who would thus be tied to the country as a whole.

As an indication of what he has in mind, Dugin discusses how the Tatars would be treated in such a system. They „would be recognized as a political subject, with a great deal of linguistic autonomy -- that is, they would have the right to speak their own language, to develop their own writing systems and ethnic culture, regardless of where they live.”

„But at the same time,” he continues, „there would not be any phenomena like Tatarstan. That is, there would not be established on the territory of the Eurasian federation a certain quasi-statehood, which would include within itself besides ethnic Tatar elements other peoples as well.”

Centralism, Dugin adds, „would thus be „preserved, but only at the level of the strategic unity of the state: the administration of the armed forces and the basic strategic areas of hte economy and transport.” Under such a system, all forms of nationalism, „including [non-ethnic] Russian nationalism,” would be blocked as unacceptable.

Dugin’s argument is interesting on both political and intellectual grounds. In recent years, Dugin has lost influence among many groups precisely because he has been almost slavishly uncritical of the approaches that President Vladimir Putin has adopted. Indeed, some in Russia now view him as a virtual mouthpiece of the Kremlin.

If that is the case, then Dugin’s article perhaps should be read as a trial balloon for another tactic in Putin’s efforts to expand central power at the expense of the country’s regions. Indeed, such an implicit threat to do away with them could be a useful weapon in this fight.

At the same time, Dugin’s remarks may reflect something else, a fear on his part and on the part of others in and around the Kremlin that Russian nationalism, the pursuit of a Russian nation state and of a „Russia for the Russians,” is now a much greater threat to their rule than the nationalisms of non-Russian groups.

But it is in the intellectual sphere that Dugin’s proposal is the most intriguing. Without mentioning its patrimony, his latest idea traces its origins back to Otto Bauer, the Austro-Marxist who called for the establishment of a state in which the nationality principle would predominate over the territorial one, a system known as „extraterritorial cultural autonomy.”

Bauer’s ideas, which were realized only once and then briefly in Estonia in the 1920s, were savagely attacked by Lenin and Stalin, and these Bolshevik attacks became the theoretical foundation of the creation of ethno-territorial federalism first in the Soviet Union and now in the Russian Federation .

When Bauer first published his argument in 1905, even those who had no political axe to grind against him argued that such a system could never be realized because the bureaucracy required to administer a state in which individuals regardless of place of residence were part of a ethnic autonomy would simply be too cumbersome.

Some recent commentators have suggested that advances in information technology have changed that equation and made such a system feasible. Dugin’s article almost certainly will invite more discussion on that point, both within the academic community and inside political circles in Moscow and in the non-Russian republics of the Russian Federation.

Paul Goble

Bron: Russia Profile

Hoe democratisch kan Europa worden? door S.W. COUWENBERG in De Internationale Spectator, september 2006.

In het We the People-project van NRC Handelsblad viel het op dat veel deelnemers het ‘nee’ tegen de voorgestelde Europese grondwet interpreteerden als een nieuwe kans Europa democratischer te maken. Zij wilden dat het Europees Grondwettelijk Verdrag met het oog daarop herschreven wordt. Maar dat verdrag beoogde de EU juist democratischer en transparanter te maken. Probleem is in dit verband nog steeds dat over de kwestie van democratie op Europees niveau veel onduidelijk blijft. Daar is in de eerste plaats de vraag welk volk we bedoelen met We The People. Is dat het volk in nationaal verband of denken we dan aan zoiets als een Europees volk?

Over dat laatste kunnen we niet spreken, menen auteurs als de Duits-Britse socioloog R. Dahrendorf en de Franse diplomaat en VN-topman J.M. Guéhenno.1 Naar hun oordeel is er geen Europees volk als basis voor een Europese democratie. Volkssoevereiniteit als democratisch grondbeginsel is in hun ogen onlosmakelijk verbonden met de natiestaat. Het hoogst bereikbare op Europees niveau, aldus Dahrendorf, is goed bestuur in de geest van de rechtsstaat.

In het debat over de Europese grondwet is eveneens het bestaan van een Europees volk ontkend. Europees burgerschap, zo betoogde de filosoof Ad Verbrugge, is dan ook een leugen.2 Het Europese integratieproces ontbeert in zijn ogen een culturele inbedding. Dat is juist. In etnisch-culturele zin is er uiteraard geen Europees volk. Maar in staatkundige zin kan er wel degelijk een Europees volk ontstaan, als gekozen wordt voor een federale opzet van Europa.

Politiek-strategische versus politiek-pragmatische aanpak
Het structurele democratische tekort van de EU is uitvloeisel van samengaan van ten dele een intergouvernementele en ten dele een federale opzet, waardoor onduidelijk blijft waaraan democratische legitimiteit van het integratieproces wordt ontleend. Dat tekort kan alleen worden opgeheven, als gekozen wordt voor een intergouvernementele of federale opzet. In het eerste geval steunt democratische legitimiteit op het nationale parlement als vertegenwoordiger van het volk in nationaal verband, in het tweede geval op het Europees Parlement als representant van het Europese staatsvolk.

Die keuze is tot nu toe ontweken door onderlinge verdeeldheid. Twee richtingen staan daarbij tegenover elkaar: een politiek-strategische richting, die op die kwestie een duidelijk antwoord stipuleert, en een pragmatische oriëntatie, die zo’n antwoord uit de weg gaat en prioriteit geeft aan stapsgewijze voortgang van het integratieproces zonder klaarheid over de vraag waarop dat proces uiteindelijk gericht is. Die laatste benadering heeft lange tijd het gelijk aan haar kant gehad. Zodoende is er namelijk veel bereikt dat alleen op die manier te verwezenlijken was. Met economische en monetaire eenwording binnen bereik en met het oog op de noodzaak de structuur en functionering van de EU aan te passen aan verdere uitbreiding, is er de afgelopen jaren van diverse kanten wél op aangedrongen het debat over doel en structuur van de EU niet langer uit te stellen.3

Na het referendum heeft PvdA-leider W. Bos dat ook gedaan.4 Clingendael-expert J. Rood bepleit daarentegen voortzetting van de pragmatische en depolitiserende aanpak van het integratieproces.5 De vraag naar de finaliteit van de Europese integratie, die besloten ligt in de vraag aan burgers wat voor Europa zij willen, acht hij een onmogelijke exercitie. Hij behoort tot degenen die in Europees verband tegen meer democratie lijkt te zijn. Dat betekent immers meer politisering van het integratieproces en dus minder speelruimte om dat op technocratische wijze verder te ontwikkelen. Inherent aan dat integratieproces is juist een exercitie in depolitisering. In pogingen besluitvorming op Europees niveau te democratiseren ziet hij dan ook slechts uitingen van illusiepolitiek.6

Opvallend is in dit verband dat in recente politicologische literatuur een verband wordt gelegd tussen het huidige euro-scepticisme en het verval van het representatieve karakter van de westers-liberale democratie. Daarin voltrekt zich, zo betoogt de Leidse politicoloog Peter Mair, een verschuiving van popular/electoral democracy (volkssoevereiniteit) naar constitutional democracy (principes van de rechtsstaat, zoals machtenscheiding en machtscontrole).7 A fortiori zien we die tendens op Europees niveau. Bij afwezigheid van een federale opzet met Europese partijen als partijpolitieke exponenten van een Europees staatsvolk en van Europese verkiezingen die kiezers in staat stellen zich duidelijk uit te spreken over de richting van de Europese politiek in economisch, cultureel en internationaal opzicht, stelt het vertegenwoordigend karakter van het Europees Parlement nauwelijks iets voor. Het mandaat dat Europarlementariërs bij die verkiezingen verkrijgen, is voornamelijk een afgeleide van het oordeel van de kiezers over de nationale politieke verhoudingen. Met allerlei democratische retoriek probeert het voorgestelde Europese Constitutionele Verdrag die Europese politiek een democratische uitstraling te geven. Maar dat kan niet verhullen dat de Europese Unie in feite functioneert als een politieke technocratie met een sterk corporatistische inslag via de niet geringe inbreng van een breed scala van belangengroepen. De politieke functie die het Europees Parlement in feite vervult, is dan ook niet die van een vertegenwoordiging van het Europese (staats)volk, maar veeleer die van een eigen rol in het Europese systeem van checks and balances.

Verschuiving in intergouvernementele richting
Hoe in het licht hiervan te voorzien in een adequate democratische legitimatie van Europese besluitvorming? Dat kan voorlopig hoofdzakelijk op nationaal niveau geschieden. Dat vindt ook de nieuwe minister van bestuurlijke vernieuwing Nicolaï, tot voor kort staatssecretaris voor Europese Zaken.8 De natiestaat is zijns inziens nog steeds het kader bij uitstek waarin democratische legitimatie gezocht moet worden. Dat standpunt is inmiddels bevestigd in het onlangs gepubliceerde ‘Speerpuntenprogramma’ van de VVD over Europese zaken. Daardoor kiest de VVD nu uitdrukkelijk voor een intergouvernementele opzet. Achter de versleten geraakte ideologische retoriek van voorheen zien we echter ook op nationaal niveau de stille opmars van een technocratische vorm van machtsuitoefening, die al rond begin jaren zestig aangekondigd is door prominente westerse sociologen als D. Bell in de Verenigde Staten, H. Schelsky in Duitsland, R. Aron in Frankrijk en P. Thoenes in Nederland, en die sinds de jaren zestig de voedingsbodem is geworden van een hernieuwd democratiseringsstreven. Maar dat heeft tot nu toe betrekkelijk weinig opgeleverd.

De keuze voor een intergouvernementele opzet van de EU heeft sinds lang ook de voorkeur van de ChristenUnie, zoals E. Middelkoop en A. Rouvoet dat onlangs in NRC Handelsblad nog eens bevestigden. Die keuze gold lange tijd als een minderheidsstandpunt, maar zij lijkt sinds het referendum aan de winnende hand. De burgers, zo menen Middelkoop en Rouvoet in dit verband, hebben hun nationale politieke loyaliteit nimmer ondergeschikt gemaakt aan het Europese ideaal. Tot het Verdrag van Maastricht gaf niettemin, althans onder politieke en intellectuele elites, een supranationaal Europees idealisme de toon aan. Opkomen voor handhaving van de eigen nationale identiteit en voor de eigen nationale belangen in Europa werd dan ook gekritiseerd als uiting van verwerpelijk geacht nationalisme. Nu de zuilen, waaraan we onze identiteit lange tijd voornamelijk ontleenden, er niet meer zijn, zo merkte in 1992 de Utrechtse historicus Righart nog op, kan Nederland het beste opgaan in Europa.9 Meer dan welk ander land, meende hij, is Nederland klaar voor Europese eenwording.

Na het Verdrag van Maastricht is er echter een kentering in meer intergouvernementele richting gekomen. Ook de Fortuyn-revolte in 2002 was daarvan een duidelijke indicatie, zij het dat op die revolte ook om die reden nog wel een rechts-populistisch stempel gedrukt werd. Maar sinds het referendum is die tendens alleen maar sterker geworden. Zij vindt nu ook weerklank in links geachte kringen en wordt daarom niet langer met rechts-populisme in verband gebracht. Het is een tendens die in de EU in het algemeen de overhand krijgt, hand in hand met de uitbreiding van de Unie. Zij gaat al terug tot de Franse president Charles de Gaulle en is door Groot-Britannië krachtig ondersteund, zodra en sinds het lid werd van de EU. Om die reden is dat land ook steeds een groot voorstander geweest van verdere uitbreiding van de EU. Dat versterkt immers de intergouvernementele optie. Door het voorgestelde Europese Constitutionele Verdrag wordt die optie overigens eerder versterkt dan verzwakt. Van een tendens naar een Europese superstaat, zoals tijdens de discussie rond het referendum over dat verdrag beweerd werd, is dan ook geen sprake.10

Europese kopgroep?
Als de huidige impasse in het Europese integratieproces niet doorbroken wordt, zal dat er waarschijnlijk toe leiden dat die integratie waarschijnlijk niet veel verder komt dan de verwezenlijking van de eerste grote doelstelling ervan: de ontwikkeling van een gemeenschappelijke Europese markt, zoals Groot-Britannië dat als lidstaat van stonde af aan beoogd heeft. De enige manier om dat proces dan nog een nieuwe impuls te geven, is de vorming van een Europese kopgroep die verder wil gaan, vooral in de richting van een Europees buitenlands en veiligheidsbeleid. In die mogelijkheid is voorzien in het Verdrag van Nice. Zo’n Europa van twee snelheden stuit wel op veel bezwaren vanwege het doorbreken van de eenheid in het Europese integratieproces.11 Niettemin is op een dergelijk Europa onlangs weer gezinspeeld door de Belgische premier Verhofstadt, die denkt aan een kern-Europa met de landen van de Eurozone; en voorts ook door de Italiaanse premier Prodi.

Door een misverstand leek het er aanvankelijk op dat Prodi Nederland daarbij uitsloot. Daarop werd van Nederlandse zijde gepikeerd gereageerd. Het is echter de vraag of Nederland in het huidige eurosceptische klimaat aan zo’n Europese voorhoederol wel zou willen deelnemen. Het kijkt nu liever de kat uit de boom en verschilt daarin van zijn Beneluxpartner België. Die presenteert zich nog onverkort als voortrekker van Europese integratie, met een sterke supranationale voorkeur.12 Een van de schaarse pleidooien in Nederland om aan zo’n Europese kopgroep deel te nemen, is te vinden in het recente boek van Karel van Wolferen en Jan Sampiemon. Zij bepleiten die deelneming daarin met klem, nu we in hun visie met het einde van het naoorlogse atlanticisme een nieuw keerpunt in onze vaderlandse geschiedenis hebben bereikt. Nederland dient in hun ogen zelfs een stuwende kracht te zijn bij de vorming van zo’n kern-Europa dat zich sterk maakt voor een zelfstandige positie en rol van Europa in de wereld.13

Nieuw referendum?
In de verlengde reflectieperiode is voor Nederland echter veel belangrijker de vraag hoe te reageren op het streven van andere lidstaten, zoals Duitsland, om het van Nederlandse zijde dood verklaarde Constitutionele Verdrag op de Europese agenda te houden en het alsnog tot een goed einde te brengen. Als het eventueel in gewijzigde vorm toch nog aan de orde komt, rijst de vraag of het dan weer aan een referendum onderworpen dient te worden. Van regeringszijde is al te kennen gegeven dat dat niet de bedoeling is. Vergeten is alweer dat vanwege de onverwacht grote belangstelling voor het eerste nationale referendum sinds 1797 de waardering voor het referendum onder onze politieke elite aanvankelijk ongelooflijk omhoog schoot. Ongelooflijk namelijk, omdat alle sinds de jaren zestig gedane voorstellen tot invoering van een met veel waarborgen omgeven referendum op een muur van verzet waren gestuit.

In het licht hiervan is het hoogst merkwaardig dat onze politieke elite er plotseling toe kwam in een recordtijd en zonder behoorlijke voorbereiding een referendum te houden over zo’n complexe en voor de meeste kiezers onbekende materie als de Europese grondwet. Dat was te meer opmerkelijk, omdat die elite de kiezers tot dan toe nauwelijks actief betrokken had bij het integratieproces, waardoor het een exclusief eliteproject was gebleven. Dat was dan ook een bijzonder ondoordachte politieke manoeuvre en een nieuwe indicatie van de verwarring en onzekerheid waarvan onze politieke elite sinds de Fortuyn-revolte blijk geeft.

Noten
1 Zie R. Dahrendorf, Die Krisen der Demokratie, 2002; J.M. Guéhenno, Le fi n de la Démocratie, 1993.
2 Zie het interview met hem in De Toren van Europa, zomernum-
mer 2004 van Christen-Democratische Verkenningen, blz. 191 e.v.
3 ‘Prodi wil twijfels over EU-beleid wegnemen’, in: Europa van morgen, 21 februari 2001. Zie in dit verband ook J.Q.Th . Rood e.a., Europa onvoltooid? Beschouwingen over de fi naliteit van de Europese integratie, Clingendael Notitie, 2001.
4 W. Bos, ‘Agenda voor een nieuwe progressieve consensus over Europa’, in: de Volkskrant, 2 juni 2005.
5 J. Rood, ‘Naar een hernieuwd Europees pragmatisme’, in: Inter-
nationale Spectator, juni 2006, blz. 291-296.
6 J. Rood, ‘Europese integratie en democratie’, in: Vrede en Veilig-
heid, 1, 2004, blz. 93 e.v.
7 P. Mair, ‘Polity-Skepticism, Party Failings and the Challenge to European Democracy’, Uhlenbeck lecture 24, NIAS, 2006.
8 A. Nicolaï, ‘De politiek terug in de politiek. Hoe de Europese Grondwet het Nederlandse EU-beleid dichter bij de burger kan brengen’, in: Internationale Spectator, april 2005, blz. 179-184, in het bijzonder blz. 183.
9 H. Righart, Het einde van Nederland?, 1992.
10 S.W. Couwenberg, ‘Europese Grondwet afgewezen – een kriti-
sche terugblik’, in: Openbaar Bestuur, september 2005.
11 B. Koopmans, ‘Diff erentiatie versus eenheid in de EU’, in: Inter-
nationale Spectator, maart 2006, blz. 119-123.
12 Zie T. Delreux, ‘Nog steeds de beste leerling van de klas?: België en het Europees constitutionaliseringsproces’, in: Internationale Spectator, juni 2006, blz. 326-331.
13 K. van Wolferen & J. Sampiemon, Een keerpunt in de vaderlandse geschiedenis, 2005, blz. 133-136.

S.W. Couwenberg

Bron: Internationale Spectator

Vladimir Putin interview in Financial Times, 10 september 2006.

An edited transcript of a meeting on between Russian President Vladimir Putin and foreign academics and journalists, including Stefan Wagstyl, the FT’s East Europe Editor. Held over lunch at the Novo Ogarevo, the presidential mansion outside Moscow, on September 9.

The menu consisted of octopus carpaccio, langoustine lasagna, and baked sea bass or veal with ceps and black truffles, followed by warm figs with yoghurt sorbet and assorted desserts.


Mr Putin started with some opening remarks about energy.

“Oil and gas energy has always been very sensitive elements of world politics and today this is true as never before. (There are)problems in the Middle East and Iran and this aggravates energy problemsaround the world.

The world is interested in the stability of Russian supplies and in Russia remaining a stable partner for her counterparts.

Still we have much in common and a lot of common interests and I propose what should unite us should be to work for cohesion and making the world more reliable and more predictable…”

FT: The oil age may end much sooner than oil runs out because of technological change. How will Russia adjust and develop other sectors?

VP: “We are working in this area. The academy of sciences and business are working on renewable energy sources and hydro-electric energy......We are working on the basis that Russia not only today but in the medium term will play a significant role in world energy.

France has 80 per cent of its energy from nuclear sources. It is 16 per cent with us. We have started and are putting together a programme to build up nuclear energy until we will reach 20 to 25 per cent of nuclear energy in the total energy supplies of our economy.

Solar energy will be more effective in other (warmer) countries. Hydro-energy will be developed. Actually our hydro energy potential is great.

Our assessments (of our potential) are a little less than for China but we will be in second placeand we intend to develop the hydro sector.

But we will use the present situation in the market (for oil and gas) it is favourable to develop our renewable energy sources.”

FT: Is Russia an energy superpower?

VP: “I would prefer to abandon the terminology of the past. Superpower is something which we used during the cold war time. Why use it now?...

We have tremendous potential in the energy sector and not everybody appreciates the potential of this energy. What is at issue now is how to make use of this tremendous potential.

It would be highly appropriate for Russia not just to produce and sell but to use this favourable factor in the economy - not only to solve some problems but to develop high technologies.

We should not just consume hydro-carbon-fuel but use it to develop nuclear energy, hydro power and renewable energy sources. This is what we are going to do.

I have never stated Russia is an energy superpower but we have more reserves than almost anybody else. We have always behaved and we will continue to behave in a responsible way. We intend to participate in the elaboration of common rules in the energy sector and to abide by rules which are developed together. But these should be fair rules that include the production of energy, the transport of energy and the consumption of energy.

(The G8) agreed that security should not be just for consumers but also for producers.” Mr Putin complained about long term take or pay gas contract where he said consumers had broken agreements. “Our security is hurt by this.”

VP:[Mr Putin referred to the European energy charter which Russia is under pressure from the EU to implement and open its gas pipelines to private companies. He said Russia had analysed the proposal and had found “extreme profits will go to intermediaries between producers and consumers”. “It will not bring down prices. Prices will continue at current levels or grow. This (ie cooperation in energy) should be equal cooperation. If they want something from us, if weallow them in what will be the benefit for us. They said they will remove some (barriers) but there is no gas production in Europe and no gas pipelines in Europe. So let’s have something equivalent in western Europe and discuss how we will be let in.”

Mr Putin complained that although Cocom lists have been cancelled the US state department still maintained high-technology export controls.)

Mr Putin also complained the European Energy Charter did not create an open market in nuclear fuel. “In the nuclear fuel market we should be put on to an equal basis.” France was free to supply nuclear fuel, he said. “We hear no hue and cry over this but...this (Russia’s position on the charter) is presented as Russia’s refusal to ratify. ..First do what you agreed to do.”

“What we want is to achieve equal relations. We don’t want superpower status. We believe this status is deliberately fostered within the EU in order to remind (people) that Russia (used to be) the evil Soviet Union.”]


FT: How do you see relations with Asia developing over the next 10 years or so?

VP: “Economic activity is moving from the Atlantic ocean to the Pacific ocean.....Russia has a certain natural advantage because it also borders the pacific ocean....we are talking with our neighbours and partners.

We would like to settle all our outstanding disputed issues with Japan, including the territorial issue on acceptable conditions for Russia and Japan.....the search for the solution will not be easy or fast but it will be possible.

As for China, we have reached a level of relations we never had before.....I believe in our entire history relations are at their best...(The conditions exist) for maintaining the best possible relations for a long time.” Mr Putin talked of common economic and political interests including in manufacturing, military equipment, technology and energy.

“.....As for energy, today only 3 per cent of our exports are accounted for by Asian countries. But in 10-15 years from now that region will account for 30 per cent of our exports in the oil and gas portfolio. We intend the construction of two gas pipelines from west and east Siberia and we intend to go forward with these projects.....experts are working on possible routes for west and east siberian pipelines. I believe we have very good prospects and it is quite doable.

(As for oil), we have started the construction of a pipeline with an (annual)capacity of 50-80 million tonnes. About 250 kilometres has been already builtin a year. I am sure we will (soon) bypass Lake Baikal...”

Mr Putin said the pipeline would be built to Skovorodino about 100-150km from the Chinese border. Russia would discuss with Japan how to transport oil from Skovorodino to the pacific coast - initially by rail and later, in the second stage of the project, by pipeline. “We are working on how to do it because we want the second stage to be as economically viable as the first stage. We need to do more (oil) exploration work in east Siberia.

FT: How do you intend and to manage and use the large budget surpluses you are accumulating?

VP: “The present and future of our economic policy and our personal priorities boil down to the fact that the (increases in) )expenditure levels should not exceed the percentage growth in the economy and should be closely linked to the efficiency of our country. We are very aware of the fact that there should be a healthy developing economy in this country.”

Mr Putin said “additional funds” drawn from reserves accumulated in the stabilisation fund and in the government budget were available but he expressed concern about the possible impact on inflation which had to be reduced to “acceptable” rates. He forecast inflation would be 9 per cent this year and hoped that in the next few years it would drop to 4-5-6 per cent. Spending on health care, welfare and education would increase - not in the manner of a petrodollar economy but in line with economic growth.

Mr Putin said the government had grouped spending into special projects, including health care, education, welfare and infrastructure. Agriculture was also on the list because agriculture meant not only food production but the livelihoods of about 40m people.

However, Russia in contrast to some European states, Russia would not subsidise exports or close its markets to for agricultural products. “We will do what is in the interests of our own consumers. We will use customs regulations but we are not intending to close down our markets and shut down our economy because it would be immoral and detrimental to the consumers our country.”

Mr Putin said he also wanted to diversify the Russian economy by promoting high technology and other sectors through the creation of high technology zones and through tax policy. “We have been gradually shifting the burden of taxation to the energy sector so we can release high technology from very excessive taxation.”


FT: The Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO)..

Mr Putin said he was surprised by the scale of the SCO’s development. Russia had not planned for it to have a wide role but to limit itself to less significant issues such as border controls between China and the states of the former Soviet Union. “A historic event” was the signing of a border treaty with China two years ago - achieved after 40 years of negotiations. The SCO developed a central role in the settlement of border issues.

“The organization (then) started to develop and spread out. I am aware of the fact that in the depths of the special services perhaps people will think that Russia and China have some clandestine motives. Are they cooking something up there?” But Mr Putin denied this, saying that countries created the organization to cooperate with each other. “After the bipolar world collapsed there was a demand for other centres of power. We understand this great principle but we are not planning anything like that. The SCO has a good future. We are not going to turn this organization into military-political bloc….”

FT: What is Russia’s position in the crisis over Iran?

VP: “Russia is opposed to the proliferation of mass destruction weapons including nuclear weapons and in this context we call upon our Iranian friends to abandon the uranium enrichment programme. The Iran problem is only part of the problem of threshold countries – countries which would like to develop nuclear energy for civilian programmes.

Russia has several concerns.

First, the enrichment of uranium for the level needed for the nuclear energy sector…is very difficult to control. If a country does any enrichment it is very difficult to verify whether the threshold has been crossed between energy and weapons programmes and spent fuel is a problem because itcan be used to produce weapons grade uranium. Therefore we propose the creation of international centres for spent fuel so counties can develop nuclear energy without their own fuel cycles.

(As for Iran), yes, indeed, they do have the right to state of the art technology. Why not in nuclear energy?” Mr Putin argues that Iran was a special case among countries developing nuclear power such as Brazil and South Africa.“We should recognise that neither Brazil nor South Africa have established in their constitution that some other state should be destroyed….This is not to the benefit of world security…Iran is in a very dangerous area, the Middle East area. That’s why we ask the Iranians to consider some alternatives.

As regards (United Nations) sanctions, I think we should together with our partners in the Group of Six think together and conduct additional consultations with the Iranian state and only afterwards think about proceeding to a sanctions regime.”

FT: How will Russia respond to its population decline and the issues raised by immigration?

Mr Putin said, firstly, that Russia was taking steps to try to increase the birth rate by improving medical centres for women, increasing social benefits for mothers and children and for those who adopt children. Russia had to create conditions for women to return to work more easily after child birth and to invest in housing.

Next, the government was committed to reducing the death rate by cutting the deaths of those people, men especially, who died prematurely through alcoholism or accidents at work.

Thirdly, immigration was nothing new for Russia. The problems caused were less acute than in the west because Russia was a multi-ethnic and multi-religious country. Immigrants from the states of the former Soviet Union (who dominate Russia’s inflows) were not foreign to Russia and spoke Russian, said Mr Putin.

“Many immigrants come to western countries and there are arguments. In our case people have not yet arrived and they are already assimilated… Of course we should take care of the interests of the indigenous people and we do.”

FT: does Russia prefer a strong or a weak European Union? What is its stance on Kosovo and on regions with frozen conflicts?

“we are interested in Europe being a strong state…It’s not easy for us to maintain dialogue with the EU if there are no clear cut structures or if Europe is in a transition or transformation phase when every few months a president or chairman is changed…We are not going to manipulate or engage in some manipulations inside the EU. And what’s more if the European states speak with a single voice in my opinion it will create favourable conditions for the development of international relations...”

(As for frozen conflicts,) we are ready to work with all our international partners and the EU as a whole in dealing with problems whenever and wherever they exist. This includes Abkhazia, South Ossetia, Nagorno Karabakh and Transdnistra…..

…As far as Kosovo is concerned we have (UN) Resolution 1244 and we cannot manipulate or ignore the Security Council decisions. Also our actions in this respect should be coordinated certainly and care should be taken of all interests in the process. One can`t apply one rule to Kosovo and other rules to other situations. In what way is the Kosovo situation different from the Abkhazia situation or the South Ossetia situation. In nothing. They are no different. If we start to manipulate the situation we will find problems. People will feel disappointed and disillusioned.”

In Kosovo, we have to think about what’s going to happen in future if Kosovo`s independence is recognized…..We heard it said things would be alright in Iraq but in Iraqi Kurdistan only the Kurdish flag is raised.”

FT: Is it right for senior Kremlin officials to assume jobs at the head of large state corporations such as Igor Sechin at Rosneft?

“We are talking about a general practice and not about the presidential administration. It applies to the government as well. It’s not that people are working in the Kremlin and in private companies. They don’t work in the companies, they only represent the interests of the state in a company where there is a state-owned share.” Mr Putin said this had no bearing on how these officials dealt with other companies. In future independent lawyers could represent the interests of the state. “But at this stage it isn’t realistic because these lawyers would immediately start taking care of their own interests…”

FT: What of Russia and Germany and the issues raised by other EU states about the planned Baltic gas pipeline.

Mr Putin said there was political and economic competition among EU states. “Several of our partners believe that developing (bilateral) ties including energy ties are not in their interests and they`re trying to interfere with that just like they interfered in the pipeline between Russia and Germany. Nothing has changed in that (behaviour)…This is the only explanation of the very confused problem of the Northern Gas Pipeline. It does not damage anybody’s interests. It does not harm anyone. It does not take anything away from anyone. The $60bn worth of gas which are been contracted will go through the new route. We are not taking any (gas) pressure from pipelines going through Poland and Ukraine. They are still there. (Their) experts understand it very well. They simply pretend they don’t know it.

What I am very much surprised is that there are some political fears in Germany. That they don’t understand (these issues)…This is a very practical connection between the Russian and European gas systems, made without damaging any interests. The struggle against this project can only be political.

“It seems serious people do understand this and the (German) government takes a very pragmatic stand in the interests of their country….”

Mr Putin expressed satisfaction with plans for Russian pipeline investments in Hungary Bulgaria and Greece and said he was not concerned about western plans for the Nabucco pipeline which could link central Europe, Turkey and the Caspian.

“I said we intend to increase oil and gas exports to Asian countries (to 30 per cent of the total). We will certainly do it but there’s a lot of political involved.”

Mr Putin referred to Ukraine saying that Russia had to consider the $5bn a year it has lost annually over 15 years in supplying cheap gas to Kiev. But – “Thank God” – there was finally an agreement earlier this year to raise prices.

“Our European and American partners decided to support the Orange Revolution…It’s is kind of shocking, problematic…If you started it, then go ahead and pay (ie subsidies to Kiev). You want the long term political benefits but you want us to pay. (If) you don’t want to pay, take a realistic look at the situation.”

Mr Putin argued that Europe would suffer economically if its metal industries paid $250 per thousand cubic metres for gas while Ukrainian competitors paid $50. “It’s a political decision by our western European and American partners. It`s a mistake and a bad approach.

“But despite all the problems we have achieved (in Ukraine) benefits for all European partners.” Mr Putin said the negotiations over the gas contract with Ukraine had been difficult but Russia had succeeded in reaching separate agreements for transit to gas to Europe and the supply to Ukraine. “The five-year transit contract which governs the energy supply to Europe, this is a huge step towards energy security in Europe. Great credit should be paid to President Yushchenko. He is a serious and responsible politician who does not go for expediency and who is a serious player in this market and makes Ukraine a respected country….”

FT: What are you three biggest achievements and what advice to you give to your successor?

Mr Putin said his achievements were to enhance the standing of the Russian state, boost the economy and repay foreign debt, and restore the international status of Russia.

For the future more had to be done to improve the lot of the poor, to fight corruption, to deal with the population decline, encourage local self-government and diversify the economy.

Mr Putin returned to the question of Kosovo. “I don’t know whether we will make the timing the resolution (which the US has suggested could happen this year) or what it will look like. But we will seek to use the rules of international relations so that they can be applied to all regions of the world. We will be guided by the interests of the participants in international relations in Europe including Serbia. And if the solution would not acceptable to us we will not hold back from using our right of veto.”

FT: What do you understand by the term sovereign democracy and what do you think of the debate in Russia about this concept?

Mr Putin said that sovereignty had to do with a country’s capacity to conduct its affairs without interference from abroad, while democracy had to do with a country’s domestic political context.

So these were two different things. But, at the same time, the world was becoming more globalised. Countries which had made economic progress and which could manipulate global mass media could project their influence through the media across national borders. “Of course there are still different nations but the global world in which we live creates a platform for such discussions. I don`t think it`s harmful if people argue about this.”

FT: Is religion important in stabilizing Russia?

VP: “Russia has always been a very religious country.” Mr Putin recalled how his own family came from a village 130 kilometres from Moscow, where his family could use church records to trace its history back to the seventeenth century. “I had never thought how stable society was. For 300 years the family lived in the same village and went to the same church.”

The Communist revolution changed every thing and created a spiritual vacuum. “Major harm has been done by the state to religions – to Jews, to the Orthodox and to Muslims – and this harm has not yet been compensated. “I think the state should support the church but at the same time we are a secular state….”

FT: Why is it that Russian policy is positive towards the Us but there is a lot of anti-American sentiment in the media, including in the state-controlled media?

Mr Putin said the programmes reflected Russian life and Russian society while foreign policy pursued pragmatically. “There is a certain dichotomy between the sentiments of the public and their perceptions – and our real policy.”

Mr Putin complained that sometimes it was difficult to work with the US on issues. “We are not going to work against American interests but we are to uphold our interests taking account the interests of our partners. This works well only if our interests are taken into account (by others).

“We have very good relations with president Bush..We want to enhance our relations with the US.” Mr Putin complained that while other countries were able to set up lobby groups in Washington, the state department was not allowing Russia to do so, and would not explain why not. “This is a critical issue. It is a compromise of the principle of equality which was applied to the Soviet Union and now it’s mechanically transferred to Russia…”

FT: Are you strengthening further central control over the region and do you still rule out standing for a third term in 2008?

VP: “Public opinion is that an overwhelming majority would like stability without any change (in the leadership). But I don’t think stability can be assured by one man alone but by the overall state of society and this depends on the constitution to a large degree..I say everybody should be equal before the law. I have no right to have any exceptions made for myself. This would be destabilizing.”

As far as centrailisation of power is concerned, Mr Putin said he thought he had done the right thing in assuming the power to nominate regional governors and take the power to do so away from the local populations. This was necessary in a country without effective parties, where local clans bound together by economic interests could take power. In any case, regional parliaments retained the right to reject the Kremlin’s nominations.

Meanwhile, the Kremlin was encouraging the development of municipal government which had “never before happened in the past.”This is a very significant step which has not been finalized yet. The notorious vertical power is not just a construction but it’s a redistribution of authority and power. It’s a search for the best possible organization of the state so that each level of the state is most effective. Not everything has been optimal but we are searching for effective solutions.

Bron: Financial Times